

新聞学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 外国語（ ） / 専門科目（新聞学）

試験時間：（ 90 ）分

1. 以下のA、Bからいずれか1問を選び、解答しなさい。

A. 「敵対的メディア認知」とは何かを説明した上で、これが当てはまると考えられる最近の事例をあげて論じなさい。

B. コミュニケーションの実証的研究における仮説の重要性について、具体例をあげつつ論じなさい。

2. 以下のA、Bからいずれか1問を選び、解答しなさい。

A. 工業化から情報化へのメディア研究の学説史を概観し、今日のジャーナリズムへの対応について論ぜよ。

B. ラジオ登場以降の「場所感の喪失」と社会変動の関係を、印刷メディアと電子メディアの情報様式論から具体的に論ぜよ。

3. 以下のA、Bからいずれか1問を選び、解答しなさい。

A. 新聞倫理綱領と内部的自由について説明しなさい。

B. NHK国際放送に関する要請放送制度について説明しなさい。

新国学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 1 外国語（英語） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ 60 ）分

以下の英文を日本語で要約しなさい

**Walter Lippmann's Theory of Public Opinion Formation**

Throughout the 1930s many other members of the social elite, especially those major at universities, shared Lasswell's vision of a benevolent, social science-led technocracy. They believed that together physical and social science held the keys to fighting totalitarianism and preserving democracy. As such, Lasswell's work commanded the attention of leading academics and opinion leaders, including one of the most powerful opinion makers of the time—Walter Lippmann, a nationally syndicated columnist for the *New York Times*.

Lippmann shared Lasswell's skepticism about the ability of average people to make sense of their social world and to make rational decisions about their actions. In *Public Opinion* (1922), he pointed out the discrepancies that necessarily exist between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads.” Because these discrepancies were inevitable, Lippmann doubted that average people could govern themselves as classic democratic theory assumed. The world of the 1930s was an especially complex place, and the political forces were very dangerous. People simply couldn't learn enough from media to help them understand it all. He described citizens in his 1925 book, *The Phantom Public*, as a “bewildered herd” of “ignorant and meddlesome outsiders” who should be sidelined as “interested spectators of action” and no more (as cited in Marshall, 2013). Even if journalists took their responsibility seriously, they couldn't overcome psychological and social barriers that prevented average people from developing useful pictures in their heads. Political essayist Eric Alterman (2008) quoted and summarized Lippmann's position, arguing that the famous columnist saw the average American as “a deaf spectator sitting in the back row. He does not know what is happening, why it is happening and what ought to happen. ‘He lives in a world he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to direct.’” Journalism, with its inclination towards sensationalism, “made things worse. Governance was better left to a ‘specialized class of men’ with inside information. No one expects a steel-worker to understand physics, so why should he be expected to understand politics” (p.10)?

These ideas raised serious questions about the viability of democracy and the role of a free press. What do you do in a democracy if you can't trust the people to cast informed votes? What good is a free press if it is impossible to effectively transmit enough of the most vital forms of information to the public? What can you do if people are so traumatized by dealing with everyday problems that they have no time to think about and develop a deeper understanding of global issues? The fact that Lippmann made his living working as a newspaper columnist lent credibility to his pessimism. In advancing these arguments, he directly contradicted the libertarian assumptions (free speech and free press) that were the intellectual foundation of the American media system.

専攻 \_\_\_\_\_ 領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 外国語（ ） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ ）分

Like Lasswell, Lippmann believed that propaganda posed such a severe challenge that drastic changes in our political system were required. The public was vulnerable to propaganda, so some mechanism or agency was needed to protect them from it. A benign but enormously potent form of media control was necessary. Media self-censorship most likely wouldn't be sufficient. Lippmann shared Lasswell's conclusion that the best solution to these problems was supposed to place control of information gathering and distribution in the hands of a benevolent technocracy—a scientific elite—who could be trusted to use scientific methods to sort fact from fiction and make good decisions about who should receive various messages. To accomplish this, Lippmann proposed the establishment of a quasi-governmental intelligence bureau that would carefully evaluate information and supply it to the other elites for decision-making. This bureau could also determine which information should be transmitted through the mass media and which information people were better off not knowing. He believed that these social engineers and social scientists, by enforcing “intelligence and information control,” would be able to “provide the modern state with a foundation upon which a new stability might be realized” (as cited in Marshall, 2013) Though this agency was never created, the notion that government should act as a gatekeeper for problematic information did gain broad acceptance among American elites during WWII and the Cold War, continuing through the Vietnam War and into the many contemporary military actions (Mathis-Lilly, 2018; Nordland, Ngu, & Abed, 2018). An obvious example is the way the federal government carefully controlled information about atomic weapons and atomic energy so that adverse public reactions were minimized throughout the Cold War (Davies, 1997).

(*Mass Communication Theory: foundations, ferment, and future.* Stanley J. Baran, Dennis K. Davis. 8th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 2021. p.53-55)

2025年度大学院入試問題（2025年 2月 16日実施）

新国学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 1 外国語（日本語） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ 60 ）分

下記のテーマについて、具体的な事例を提示し、1000字程度で論述しなさい。

「民主シーとあいまいさ」

新体学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 2 外国語（英語） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ 45 ）分

下記の全文を日本語に訳しなさい。

News media can increase the salience of climate change by relating its effects (for example, an increase in extreme weather events such as wildfires, drought, and hurricanes) to human causes.

Put succinctly by political scientist Bernard Cohen in 1963, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1963). Consistent with Cohen’s postulate, after surveying potential voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, journalism scholars Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) found that the media’s agenda setting, or how frequently and to what degree an outlet features an issue, was powerfully correlated (+0.967) to what voters considered to be a campaign’s most salient issues. Two decades later, John Kingdon (1995) argued that highly salient issues are more likely to be discussed and prioritized by governmental institutions. Significantly, issues that are prominently featured in the news factor more highly in voter decisions about political candidates (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). Subsequent research that included media coverage of climate change found that mainstream media also can influence agenda setting when filtered through social media, an effect that was strongest among those with low levels of political interest (Feezell 2017).

To put this communication theory simply, agenda setting focuses the public’s attention on certain issues in consequential ways.

The challenge to be addressed:

Although 65 percent of American adults are worried about global warming, the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication found that only 33 percent of American adults hear about climate change in the news about once a week or more; the other 67 percent hear about climate change once a month or less often (Marlon et al. 2022).

In June 2022, Gallup data indicated that Americans are not prioritizing climate change as an issue. When asked, “What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?” 2 percent answered, “Environment/Pollution/Climate change” (Gallup 2022).

出典：American Academy of Arts & Sciences. (2023, March 7). Proven Principles of Effective Climate Change Communication.

[https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/Climate-Communication-Principles\\_White-Paper.pdf](https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/Climate-Communication-Principles_White-Paper.pdf)

新聞学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・**前後期共通**）

試験科目：第 2 外国語（**独語**） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ 45 ）分

下記の全文を日本語に訳しなさい。

### Wie stark können Soziale Medien Wahlen beeinflussen?

Am 23. Februar 2025 wird in Deutschland der Bundestag neu gewählt. Für den Tech-Multimilliardär und Trump-Vertrauten Elon Musk ist klar, wer die Parlamentswahl gewinnen sollte: Die AfD, die vom deutschen Verfassungsschutz in Teilen als gesichert rechtsextrem eingestuft wird. Nur die AfD könne Deutschland retten, schrieb Musk auf der ihm gehörenden Internetplattform X. AfD-Chefin Alice Weidel bot er dort die Gelegenheit für ein gemeinsames Gespräch. In den deutschen Sozialen Medien gilt die AfD als die agilste Partei, vor allem auf der chinesischen Social-Media-Plattform TikTok. Videos mit AfD-Positionen werden dort von hunderttausenden Menschen geschaut.

Laut Politik- und Kommunikationsberater Johannes Hillje wurde jedes Video der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion in den Jahren 2022 und 2023 durchschnittlich mehr als 430.000 Mal aufgerufen. Zum Vergleich: Den zweitbesten Wert erzielte die konservative CDU/CSU-Fraktion – mit durchschnittlich rund 90.00 Aufrufen.

### Begünstigen Soziale Medien rechte Parteien?

Nein, sagt Andreas Jungherr, Professor für Politikwissenschaft und Digitale Transformation an der Otto-Friedrich-Universität in Bamberg. "Die AfD war schon sehr früh in den Sozialen Medien dabei." Sie habe gelernt, welche Ansprache dort funktioniere. Das sei ein klarer Vorteil für die Reichweite – doch die alleine sichere noch keinen Wahlerfolg, so Jungherr. Deutlich werde das etwa an der Kampagne der US-Präsidentenskandidatin Kamala Harris, die großen Erfolg in den Sozialen Medien hatte. Für den Einzug ins Weiße Haus reichte das aber bekanntermaßen nicht.

出典：Deutsche Welle 2025年1月10日より抜粋

新博学

専攻

領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 2 外国語（日本語） / 専門科目（ ）

試験時間：（ 45 ）分

下記の全文を日本語に訳しなさい。

2022年，美国各行业呈现后疫情时代的复苏态势。在“中期选举年”密集投放竞选广告的助推下，美国传媒业的整体广告收入同比增长9.4%。由新冠疫情带来的信息渠道变化，导致新闻业的“数字化转向”愈演愈烈。受社交媒体与数字订阅的影响，选择以互联网为主要新闻获取渠道的美国公众高达67%，选择印刷媒体的公众比例再次下滑，从2021年的16%下降至15%<sup>①</sup>。同时，美国传统印刷纸媒发行量持续走低，排前25名的媒体在新一年的发行量平均下降12%，仅佛罗里达州的《村庄太阳报》（*Villages Daily Sun*）实现同比正增长，而这一“特殊”的增长态势主要得益于当地退休社群的扩大和订阅价格的再度降低<sup>②</sup>。不难看出，美国传统印刷纸媒正在经受传播力下降与营收下滑的双重考验。

“纸媒遇冷”已然成为数字化时代定式，美国媒体积极推进数字化转型创新，以纾解经营困境。2022年，《纽约时报》数字订阅量大幅跃升至910万份，与其纸媒发行量的持续走低形成鲜明对比<sup>③</sup>。与此同时，以“订阅堆栈”（Substack）为代表的新兴内容订阅平台异军突起，收获了超过150万付费用户和高达3000万次的月访问量<sup>④</sup>。区别于雇用记者从而直接生产新闻等内容产品的传统媒体机构，Substack通过“平台”模式，以“连接”代替“拥有”，为内容创作者提供技术支持和一键分发等服务，鼓励创作者自主决策，借助平台生产、发布内容并与用户建立长期关系。当用户为阅读信息内容支付费用时，平台则从付费订阅收入中抽取10%作为佣金。以Substack为代表的个人化付费内容平台被视作“摆脱新闻机构束缚”的一种可能，其在收获年轻受众喜爱的同时，也吸引了社交媒体巨头的关注。推特于2021年收购了同类平台Revue，承诺仅收取5%的订阅费用；脸书则自创号称“Substack竞品”的内容订阅平台Bulletin，并表示不会抽取任何中介费用以吸引更多内容创作者和用户<sup>⑤</sup>，这将掀起一场新的流量之争。

相比于大型主流媒体，美国地方新闻业在数字化的转型过程中则尽显颓势。新冠疫情导致的经济衰退影响了区域经济的发展，部分地方媒体由此失去主要广告性收入，特别是在数字基础设施匮乏、从业人员流失等多重因素影响下，美国地方新闻业似乎自此走向没落。美国西北大学发布的《2022年地方新闻业发展报告》显示，2019~2022年，共有360多份地方性报纸停止发行，

専攻 \_\_\_\_\_ 領域（博士前期/修士・博士後期・前後期共通）

試験科目：第 外国語（ \_\_\_\_\_ ） / 専門科目（ \_\_\_\_\_ ）

試験時間：（ \_\_\_\_\_ ）分

超过 1/5 的美国人口（约 7000 万人）生活在“新闻荒漠”（news deserts）之中，难以获取及时、可信的新闻信息，地区间的新闻鸿沟日益深化，社区凝聚力也随之降低<sup>②</sup>。诚然，Substack 于 2022 年 5 月启动主打本地化内容的“Substack Local”计划，试图探寻与开创新型地方新闻商业模式，但在 Patch 数字新闻编辑室、美国新闻计划等“拯救美国地方新闻”项目纷纷落败后，媒体行业人士对此模式的态度并不乐观，认为 Substack 至多成为本地新闻信息的补充来源，而无法彻底成为“替代品”。

众选择回避新闻以减少“不必要的争论”，这对新闻记者唤起受众兴趣、提升媒体公信力带来严峻的现实挑战<sup>①</sup>。

与传统新闻业相似，面对流媒体的“大举进军”，不论是超级碗、世界杯等重大体育赛事，还是饱受关注的美国中期选举，都未能阻挡美国电视行业收视率全面且连续下滑的衰落局面。在收视排名前 10 的美国电视媒体中，仅有华纳旗下着力于体育节目的“娱乐与体育节目电视网”（ESPN）收视率迎来上涨（见表 1）。唯一值得庆幸的是，政治选举与体育赛事仍旧为电视媒体带来丰厚的广告收入，这一数据同比增长 6.1%<sup>②</sup>。其中，美国全国广播公司（NBC）仅靠独家播出的超级碗赛事便收获约 5.78 亿美元<sup>③</sup>。此外，在 2022 年美国最受欢迎的 50 档电视节目中，仍有超过半数并非流媒体平台原创节目<sup>④</sup>。由此可见，许多热门电视节目制作商仍然重视传统媒体工作者的创作能力和渠道的引流作用，采取传统电视频道和流媒体平台共同策划推出的策略，从而覆盖更多受众以实现影响力的最大化。

新聞学

専攻

領域 ( 博士前期/修士・博士後期・前(後)期共通 )

試験科目 : 第 2 外国語 ( 韓国語 ) / 専門科目 ( )

試験時間 : ( ) 分

下記の全文を日本語に訳しなさい。

## 오늘 오후4시 尹탄핵 2차표결 與의원 8명이상 찬성때 통과 “자유 투표해야” 목소리 커져 친윤도 “가결 막기 힘들 것”

윤석열 대통령에 대한 두 번째 탄핵소추안이 13일 오후 국회 본회의에 보고됐다. 여야는 14일 오후 4시 국회 본회의에서 무기명 투표로 윤 대통령 탄핵 여부를 결정짓는다. 이번 탄핵소추안 표결은 3일 밤 위헌·불법 논란이 불거진 윤 대통령의 비상계엄 선포 후 11일 만이다. 탄핵소추안은 재적 의원(300명)의 3분의 2(200명) 이상 찬성이면 가결된다. 여당(108명)을 제외한 192명 의원이 모두 탄핵 찬성을 투표한다는 가정 아래 여당 의원 8명 이상이 찬성표를 던지면 탄핵소추안이 가결된다. 윤 대통령의 계엄 선포로 11일간 대한민국에서 벌어진 정치, 외교안보, 경제 혼란 상황을 일단 해소하고 다음 단계로 넘어갈 수 있는지가 여당 의원들의 선택에 달린 것이다.

국민의힘 권성동 원내대표는 이날 오후 기자간담회를 열고 “탄핵안 표결에 관한 당론은 내일(14일) 의원총회에서 108명의 의원과 최종 결정하겠다”며 “일단 지금은 탄핵 반대가 당론이다. 의원들과 의견을 나눠 신중하게 결정하겠다”고 밝혔다.

다. 국민의힘 새 원내지도부 핵심 관계자는 “이미 탄핵에 찬성하겠다는 의원이 많은데 무엇으로 막을 수 있겠느냐”며 탄핵 가결 흐름을 바꾸긴 힘들 것이라고 내다봤다.

윤 대통령의 운명을 진 국민의힘에선 “자유투표는 하게 될 것”이라는 목소리가 힘을 얻고 있다. 전날(12일) 국민의힘 한동훈 대표가 “당론으로 탄핵 찬성을 제안한다”고 밝힌 가운데, 이날 친윤 진영에서도 “당론으로 탄핵 반대는 유지해야 하지만 표결까지 막을 수는 없는 분위기”라는 목소리가 나왔다. 권 원내대표 역시 “당론이 결정되도 호소하는 것 외에 (당론을) 강제할 방법은 없다”고 말했다.

첫 번째 탄핵소추안(7일)은 국민의힘의 당론 불참으로 의결 정족수(200명)가 모자라 폐기됐지만 두 번째 표결은 여당에서도 투표에 참여하겠다는 의원들이 20명이 넘는 상황이다. 공개적으로 탄핵 찬성 의사를 밝힌 7명에 더해 탄핵 찬성 의사를 가진 익명의 의원도 더 있어 가결은 불가피해지고 있다는 관측이 나온다. 권 원내대표도 “그렇게 예상하는 사람들이 많은 걸로 안다”고 말했다.

이날 국회 본회의에 보고한 2차 탄핵소추안에는 12·3 비상계엄의 위헌·불법성 외에도 대통령의 지휘 아래 계엄군과 경찰이 국회의원 체포를 시도한 점 등이 탄핵 사유로 담겼다. 더불어민주당 이재명 대표는 여당을 향해 “역사가 여러분의 선택을 기억할 것”이라며 “부디 내일은 탄핵 찬성 표결에 동참해 달라”고 촉구했다.

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